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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Castro regime comes to an end, the Cuban people
will face the monumental task of building a new political and
economic system out of the remnants of the old. If the recent
history of the Western Hemisphere serves as a guide, they will
reject Castro's totalitarian legacy and instead embrace the principles
of democracy, free-market economics, and the rule of law.
Adopting a new constitution based on these principles will be the
first and foremost step in the construction of a new Cuba.
None of the principles on which the new constitution should
be based will be more critical to the success of the rebuilding
enterprise than the protection of private property rights. These
rights should be given constitutional protection not only for reasons
of principle, but also of economic necessity. As a matter of
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principle, a system of private property rights adequately protected
by the law, and free from excessive restrictions, is a necessary
condition to the creation of a free-market democracy.' As a matter
of economic necessity, a system of private property rights so
guaranteed will have to be established and enforced, if the country
is to have any hope of attracting sufficient investment capital to
rebuild its economy. No capital will flow to Cuba, in the amounts
that Cuba needs, absent strong and credible guarantees that private
property and enterprise will enjoy at least as much protection in
Cuba as in the competing capital-importing nations of the
hemisphere.
In this article, we make suggestions concerning the form and
extent of the private-property protections that, in our view, should
be included in a post-Castro Cuban constitution. Our analysis is
based on the property-related provisions of the 1940 Cuban
constitution. Within this framework, we suggest aspects that need
revision, or at least re-evaluation, in order to bring those provisions
in line with current political and economic experience and thought.
In the Appendix we set forth, in outline form, a Program for
the Restoration of Property Rights, presented as a proposal to be
adopted by a democratic post-Castro government. Such a program
would complement and reinforce the provisions of the new
constitution protecting property rights. The Castro regime
collectivized the Cuban economy not by orderly takings followed by
payment of just compensation, but by outright destruction of the
fabric of private property rights. It will be the new government's
responsibility to restore those property rights by providing the
dispossessed owners with adequate economic redress, whether in
1. See, e.g., MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962);
FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTrrUTION OF LIBERTY 140 (Gateway ed. 1972);
WALTER LIPPMAN, THE METHOD OF FREEDOM (1934); JOHN TRENCHARD &
THOMAS GORDON, CATO'S LETTERS No. 68 (Walthoe ed. 1754-1755), reprinted
in THE ENGLISH LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE (Jacobson ed. 1965); Stanley N. Katz,
Thomas Jefferson & the Right to Property in Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 467 (1976); Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 734
(1964).
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the form of restitution, compensation, or compensation-in-kind.
The restoration of property fights is an imperative of
fundamental fairness. It is also a goal supported by sound political
and economic reasons. Politically, a property-restoration program
will legitimize the new government in the eyes of the former
owners and will show to the international investment community
that the protection of property rights in the new constitution is not
an empty promise. Economically, the program will provide a
means of resolving claims on confiscated property, thereby
contributing to the development of stable and secure markets. In
sum, the redress of the wrongs suffered by the dispossessed owners
at the hands of the Castro regime is an essential component of the
robust system of property rights that the new constitution should
define and protect.
H. THE 1940 CONSTITUTION
The 1940 Cuban constitution was adopted against the
background of four decades of internal political turmoil, a legacy of
American overlordship, and frequent military interventions. The
constitution of 1901, which was the first constitution of an
independent Cuba following the Spanish-American War,
incorporated what became known as the Platt Amendment, a series
of provisions first enacted into United States law as part of the
Military Appropriations Act of 1901. The Platt Amendment
provided, among other things, that the United States had the right
to intervene on Cuba's behalf to protect Cuban independence and
to ensure the maintenance of a government adequate to protect "life,
property and individual liberty."2
2. 31 Stat. 897, ch.803 (1901); RAM6N INFIA, HIsToRiA CONSTrrUciONAL
DE CUBA, 318-31 (La Habana, 1942). The Platt Amendment also barred Cuba
from entering into any treaty that impaired its independence and from assuming
any public debt absent adequate means of repayment. It also required the Cuban
government to sell or lease to the United States land necessary for establishing
naval stations in Cuba.
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Until the Platt Amendment was revoked in 1934, the United
States frequently intervened in Cuban domestic affairs, often to
restore order in the aftermath of a presidential succession. The end
of the United States interventions did not result in political stability.
A civilian-military revolution in 1933 was followed by a succession
of interim civilian governments, which were gradually eclipsed by
the rising power of Colonel Fulgencio Batista and the army.3
In 1940, a Constitutional Convention was called to write a
new constitution in preparation for a return to representative
democracy. The convention, which included among its members
representatives of all sectors of Cuban political opinion, undertook
to settle all outstanding political disputes by crafting elaborate and
detailed compromises and incorporating them in the constitutional
text.4 The resulting charter, adopted as the Constitution of 1940,
is a remarkably lengthy and casuistic document. More like a code
than a constitution, it consists of an aggregate of provisions owing
more to history and the peculiar circumstances of the time than to
a coherent political doctrine. In the area of property rights, for
example, the 1940 constitution contained one of the strongest
guarantees found anywhere against expropriation of property
without full compensation, but it also contained other provisions
paying obeisance to the "social function" conception of property,
prohibiting the acquisition of large estates, and restricting the
property rights of foreigners and the alienability of property owned
by the State.
The 1940 constitution came into force on July 8, 1940 and
remained in effect until 1952. On April 4, 1952, Fulgencio Batista,
who had seized power by overthrowing the elected government,
3. See generally Carlos Marquez Sterling, Prdlogo to NtSTOR CARBONELL
CORTINA, EL ESPftITU DE LA CONSTrTucI6N CUBANA DE 1940, 11-38 (1974)
[The Spirit of the Cuban Constitution] [hereinafter "CARBONELL CORTINA"].
4. See MARIFELI P REZ-STABLE, THE CUBAN REvOLUTION: ORIGINS, COURSE
AND LEGACY (1993); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CUBA AND THE
RULE OF LAW 78-112 (1962).
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replaced the 1940 constitution with a new Constitutional Act
designed to serve as the instrument of governance until new
elections were held. The elections were won by Batista, the sole
candidate who stood, and the 1940 constitution was reinstated on
February 24, 1955. Less than two years later, on December 2,
1956, Batista issued a decree suspending the constitutional
guarantees in several provinces for 45 days. That decree was
renewed, with two brief respites, every 45 days until May 17,
1958. On that date, a Special Act was passed declaring a state of
national emergency, which was still in effect when Batista fled
Cuba on January 1, 1959.
When Fidel Castro came to power on January 1, 1959, the
1940 constitution was once again proclaimed the law of the land.
Nevertheless, in the three weeks between January 13 and February
7, 1959, the constitution was amended, by revolutionary flat, no
fewer than five times. The amendments primarily had the effect of
concentrating power in the hands of Castro, revoking constitutional
guarantees against retroactive criminal statutes, and allowing
confiscation of property owned by those individuals who were
branded as accomplices of the Batista regime. On February 7,
1959, only five weeks after taking power, Castro abandoned all
pretenses and discarded the 1940 constitution in favor of a new
Fundamental Law.
The 1940 constitution has taken a strong symbolic
importance for Cubans, for it is generally regarded as the sole
Cuban Constitution that was created under a true representative
mandate and without undue foreign influence. It was used by
Castro as a mantle during the events leading up to the overthrow of
Batista in 1959--though the mantle was shed as soon as it was no
longer needed. The 1940 constitution is still regarded by many
Cuban exiles as the last source of political legitimacy in Cuba and
5. INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, supra note 4, at 78-112. The
decree issued on the same day that Fidel Castro arrived by boat on the shore of
the province of Oriente. The provinces affected by the decree were Oriente,
Camagdiey, Las Villas and Pinar del Rfo.
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the legal foundation of their claims. For these reasons, it is a
widely held view that the 1940 constitution should form the basis
for the first free constitution of a post-Castro Cuba.
With due regard for these sentiments, the provisions of the
1940 constitution should not be accepted uncritically. The political,
social and economic circumstances of post-Castro Cuba, and of the
world into which the new constitution will be brought, are very
different from those that existed in 1940. In these circumstances,
many of the political compromises reflected in the 1940 constitution
are no longer relevant and may be inappropriate to post-Castro
Cuba. Accordingly, the property provisions contained in the 1940
constitution should be re-examined to assess whether they will
comport with the values and needs of Cubans in the post-Castro era.
I. THE PROTECTION OF PRIVATE PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN THE 1940 CONSTITUTION
The provisions of the 1940 constitution that are more or less
directly related to the protection of property rights can be classified,
for expository purposes, into two categories: core provisions,
which determine the basic extent of the property rights protected by
the constitution and the nature of the protection, and non-core
provisions, which further specify or limit the scope of those
property rights in certain particular circumstances.
The category of core provisions includes Article 24, which
prohibits confiscations and lays down the requirements for the
constitutional validity of expropriations; Article 87, which
recognizes the legitimacy of private property and refers to the
boundaries of the concept; Article 23, which prohibits retroactive
laws affecting civil obligations; and Article 92, which provides for
the protection of intellectual-property rights.
The non-core provisions related to the protection of property
rights are the following:
0 Article 33, which authorizes the seizure of books, records,
motion pictures or other publications that attack the honor
19951
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of persons, social order or public peace;
* Article 43, which guarantees the right of married women to
control their own property;
* Article 88, which excludes the subsoil from private
ownership and requires that certain assets and businesses be
put to economic use in a manner that promotes the general
welfare;
* Article 89, which gives the State a pre-emption right in
every forced sale of real estate or securities representing real
estate;
* Article 90, which proscribes latifundia and authorizes
restrictions on the ownership of land by foreigners;
* Article 91, which allows farmers to set aside certain plots of
agricultural land as "family property" (homestead) and
restricts the alienability of such land;
* Article 93, which prohibits perpetual encumbrances on
property for the benefit of private persons;
* Article 252, which restricts the alienability of property
owned by the State;
* Article 273, which provides that the State is entitled to a
portion of any increase, resulting solely from State action,
in the value of real estate;
* Article 274, which regulates leases and other contracts
related to agricultural land;
* Article 275, which authorizes restrictions on the vertical
integration of the sugar industry; and
* Article 276, which proscribes laws and regulations that
create or have the effect of creating private monopolies.
In the following sections we offer a brief analysis and
critical appraisal of each of the core and non-core provisions.
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A. The Core Provisions
1. Article 24
The cornerstone of the system of protection of property
rights established by the 1940 constitution is Article 24. This
provision, which is included in Title IV of the constitution, entitled
"Fundamental Rights," reads as follows:
Confiscation of property is prohibited. No one shall
be deprived of his property except by a competent
judicial authority, for a justified cause of public
utility or social interest, and after payment of the
respective indemnification, fixed judicially, in cash.
Non-compliance with these requirements shall give
rise to the right of the person who has been
expropriated to be protected by the courts and, if the
case calls for it, to receive restitution of his
property.6
The genuineness of the cause of public utility or social interest and
the need for the expropriation shall be determined by the courts in
the event of a challenge.7
The basic guarantee established by this article is that
confiscation of property is forbidden. Confiscation, in the sense in
which the term was used in the constitutional debates, is "every
taking of private property by a governmental authority without
payment of the required compensation, whether directly or
indirectly, through legal procedures or by force, by way of penalty
6. CONSTITucI6N DE CUBA art. 24.
7. All translations are by the authors.
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or otherwise."8 A proposal to provide for progressive land taxes
was rejected by the Constitutional Convention after spirited debate,
on the ground that it would amount to indirect confiscation and lead
to the collectivization of property.9
Article 24 authorizes non-confiscatory takings of property
(expropriations) based on reasons of public utility or social interest
and preceded by the payment of due indemnification. Although the
initiative for an expropriation may lie with the political organs of
the government, it is for the judiciary to determine the
indemnification to be paid and to decree the transfer of title once the
constitutional requirements are met. It is also for the courts to
determine whether the reasons invoked by the government of public
utility or social are genuine or a mere pretext and whether the
expropriation is necessary to achieve the desired ends. Although
the measure of compensation is not made explicit, the term
"indemnification" (indemnizaci6n) indicates that compensation must
be sufficient to leave the owner without any harm (damnum). The
indemnification must be paid, in cash, before the expropriation
takes place.
Article 24 is one of the strongest guarantees against
uncompensated takings that can be found in any constitution, past
or present. There is no question that its basic structure and
provisions should be preserved in the new Cuban constitution.
Nevertheless, since the new constitution will be interpreted and
applied by an untested judiciary, it would be wise to introduce a
greater degree of precision at least in the requirement of
compensation. It should be made explicit that the indemnification
that is being required must be equal to the full fair-market value of
the property taken, disregarding any diminution in such value
8. CONSTrrucI6N DE CUBA 341 (Andrds M. Lazcano Y Mazon ed.
1941)(Statement by Jos6 M. Cortina)[hereinafter CONVENTION REcoRDs]; See
also CARBONELL CORTINA, supra note 3, at 159.
9. See CONSTrruci6N DE CUBA 568-88 (Andr~s M. Lazcano y Mazon ed.
1941); See also CARBONELL CORTINA, supra note 3, at 160.
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resulting from any announcement or threat of expropriation or any
other unlawful act against the property or its owner.
2. Article 87
Article 87, the first provision of Section Two ("Property")
of Title VI, contains a further guarantee of the legitimacy of
property rights and a rough characterization of the scope of those
rights: "The Cuban State recognizes the existence and legitimacy of
private property in its broadest concept as a social function and with
no limitation other than those established by Law for reasons of
public necessity or social interest. "'0
The guarantee contained in this article is framed as the
recognition by the State of the existence and legitimacy of private
property, to the extent specified in the same provision. This
formula is unfortunate, because it seems to imply that private
property is guaranteed not as a matter of fundamental right but as
a gracious concession by the State.1 In fact, the apologetic tone of
this provision accurately reflects the intensity with which left-wing
parties opposed it at the Constitutional Convention. 12  The
constitutional protection of private property rights was not a
10. CONsTrTucI6N DE CUBA art. 87.
11. This statement is independent of the jurisprudential question (which need
not detain us here) whether the fundamental rights proclaimed in a given
constitution are natural rights that preexist that constitution and are merely
recognized by it, or whether they are, qua legal rights (and independently of the
existence of any moral counterparts), creatures of the constitution, understood as
the foundation of the (positive) legal order. Even those who sympathize with the
second position (as do the authors of this article) must readily admit that the form
given to the constitutional guarantee of property rights has political significance,
and that the politico-rhetorical weight carried by that guarantee may affect the
way in which it is interpreted and applied by the courts. If fundamental rights
such as freedom of expression, assembly, or religion are proclaimed in emphatic
terms, the right of private property deserves no less.
12. See CONVENTION REcoRDs, supra note 8, at 337-64.
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universally accepted political goal in the Cuba of 1940. In a post-
Castro constitution, the legitimacy of private property should be
proclaimed in the same emphatic terms as in the case of other
fundamental rights.' 3
Article 87 protects private property "in its broadest concept
as a social function and with no limitation other than those
established by law for reasons of public necessity or social
interest."' 4 Leaving aside for the moment the reference to property
as a "social function," this clause prohibits limitations on the scope
of private property rights other than those that meet two
individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions: (i) that the
limitation be established by law, and (ii) that it be adopted for
reasons of public necessity or social interest.
The requirement that limitations be established by law (often
referred to as the principle of legality) is a fundamental procedural
guarantee against unauthorized or arbitrary limitations. In
comparable settings, it has been interpreted as the principle that no
limitation on property or other rights is valid unless it is based on
a substantive law that is (i) reasonably precise, to enable the citizen
to foresee the consequences of a given action, and (ii) reasonably
non-discretionary, to protect the citizen against arbitrary,
interferences by public officials in the citizen's exercise of those
rights.15 This principle excludes, for example, limitations that have
13. Cf CONST. ARG. art. 17 (property is inviolable), and CONsTrrucI6N DE
LA REPUBLICA DEL PERt art. 70 (right to property is inviolable).
14. CONSTITUCI6N DE CUBA [1944] art. 87.
15. See, e.g., Olsson Case, 130 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) at 61
(1988)(interpreting the phrase "in accordance with the law" in one of the
provisions of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms). For analysis of this principle as it appears in human rights
instruments, see OscAR M. GARIBALDI, THE LIMITATION AND DEROGATION
CLAUSES 128,132-134 (Hurst Hanum and Dana D. Fischer eds., 1993); Oscar
M. Garibaldi, General Limitations on Human Rights: The Principle of Legality,
17HARv. INT'L L. J. 503 (1976).
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no legal basis; that are imposed at the whim of public officials; by
ad hoc pronouncements aimed at particular persons or groups; by
rules so open-ended that the owner cannot know in advance the
limits placed upon the use and enjoyment of his property. 16 In
addition, since the Cuban legal system once was and will again be
based on statutory law, the phrase "established by law" should be
interpreted to require that limitations be based on laws enacted by
the Congress, as distinguished from limitations based merely on
administrative regulations or judicial precedent. 7 So understood,
this requirement should be retained in the new constitution.
The principle that property rights may not be limited except
for reasons of general interest or general utility (to use concepts that
are widely used in politico-philosophical discourse) is sound as a
principle, though it is often subjected to egregious abuses in its
application. Some version of this principle should be included in
a post-Castro Cuban constitution, but it would be prudent to
describe with greater precision the reasons that may legitimately be
invoked by the State to justify limitations on property rights. In this
respect, the concepts used in Article 87 could stand clarification.
"Public necessity" appears to be narrower than "social interest" and
also narrower than "public utility" (a concept that appears in Article
24), but it is not clear whether the first concept is subsumed under
any of the other two. Nor is it clear whether the concept of "social
interest" is coextensive with, or broader than, the traditional notions
of "public interest" or "general interest" that are often found in
liberal constitutions (liberal, that is, in the classical sense of the
term).
In any case, it would be desirable to specify that, at least
beyond a certain threshold, any limitation on private property rights
must be subject to the payment of compensation in accordance with
16. See GARIBALDI, supra note 15, at 128, 132-34.
17. For a similar analysis in the context of the interpretation of Article 30 of
the American Convention on Human Rights, see (Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.) San Jose
7 HuM. R. L.J. 231 (1986).
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the principles of Article 24. Confiscation of property is no less
destructive of economic and personal freedom if it is achieved
insidiously through regulation.
Article 87 recognizes the legitimacy of private property "in
its broadest concept as a social function.t" The doctrine that private
property is (or has) a social function, once fashionable and still
common in Latin America, derives from the so-called social
doctrine of the Roman Catholic Church. According to this
doctrine, private property is legitimate only to the extent that it
fulfills a social function, i.e., that it is used and enjoyed in such a
way that it furthers the common good. 18  A critique of this
conception from a philosophical perspective would exceed the scope
of this paper. But even if this doctrine were sound as moral theory,
it would be unnecessary and potentially dangerous to incorporate it
in the new Cuban constitution.
After the fall of Castro, Cuba will desperately need to
strengthen the institution of private property to develop markets and
to attract outside investment. To attain these goals, the new
constitution must provide for a robust form of protection for private
property rights-subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by
law and are based on reasonably precise legitimacy criteria set forth
in the constitution itself. By contrast, one critical role of the
doctrine of the social function of property is to delegitimize certain
ways in which property may be used and enjoyed and,
correspondingly, to legitimize restrictions imposed by the State to
curtail such use and enjoyment--all on the basis of criteria that are
extraneous to the constitution and open-ended, for they depend on
the evolving tenets of the doctrine. If this doctrine were
incorporated in the new constitution, particularly if it became, as in
18. For a recent statement of this doctrine, see JOHN PAUL II, ENCYCLICAL
LETTER SOLLIcITuDO REI SociALs, 30 December 1987, 42. For earlier
statements, see LEO XIII, ENCYCLICAL LETTER RERUM NOvARuM, 15 May 1891,
8; Pius XI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER QUADRAGESIMO ANNO, 15 May 1931, 44-
48, 69, 88. See also CARBONELL CORTINA, supra note 3, at 157-58.
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Article 87, a component of the definition of the property rights that
the constitution protects, it could easily be used (or misused) to
justify limitations on property rights, derived from the nebulous
notion of "social function," beyond those established by law for
reasons expressly declared legitimate by the constitution.
None of these observations is meant to deny or to preclude
the influence of the doctrine of the social function of property as a
moral theory. The legislators in post-Castro Cuba may resort to
this theory, or to any other system of moral or political norms, for
inspiration or guidance in the crafting of limitations on property
rights. But in so doing, the legislators should abide by the
conditions imposed by the constitution for the legitimacy of such
limitations.
3. Article 23
Article 23 protects another form of private property: rights
that are the correlatives of civil obligations arising out of contracts
or other acts or omissions. The protection takes the form of a
nearly absolute bar on retroactive legislation affecting those rights.
To understand the scope of Article 23, it is necessary to
consider Article 22, which authorizes, under severely restrictive
conditions, retroactive non-criminal legislation. Under Article 22,
non-criminal laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the
following conditions are met: (i) the law itself must provide for
such an effect; (ii) the retroactive effect must be based on reasons
of public policy, social utility or national necessity expressly stated
in the law; (iii) the law must be approved by two-thirds of the total
membership of each legislative chamber; (iv) the law must provide
for compensation for damages that the holders of rights vested
under prior law may suffer as a result of the retroactive effect of the
law; and (v) the law ceases to be valid if it produces effects contrary
to Article 22, that is, if it has confiscatory consequences. In
addition, Article 22 provides that the grounds for the retroactivity
of the law may be challenged before the Tribunal of Constitutional
19951 239
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Guarantees, which cannot decline to rule on the matter for any
reason whatsoever.
Article 23 contains a further restriction on the validity of
retroactive legislation. The first sentence of that provision reads as
follows: "The obligations of a civil nature that arise out of contracts
or other acts or omissions that give rise to them cannot be annulled
or altered by the Legislative Branch or the Executive Branch and,
consequently, no laws shall have retroactive effects in respect of
such obligations. "19
The remainder of Article 23 sets forth a limited exception to
the rule just quoted. Under the exception, the State is permitted to
suspend the exercise of legal actions based on such civil obligations,
but only in a case of a grave national emergency and only for such
time as may be reasonably necessary. Any such suspension would
also be subject to the first four requirements set forth in Article 22
and could be challenged by the same procedure established in that
provision.
The principles of Articles 22 and 23 constitute reasonable
compromises between the interests of those who hold property
rights derived from contracts and other civil obligations and the
legitimate interests of the public. Those principles should be
retained in a post-Castro constitution.
4. Article 92
Article 92 extends constitutional protection to intellectual
property. It provides, in its first paragraph, that "[e]very author or
inventor shall enjoy the exclusive ownership of his work or
invention, subject to the limitations determined by Law regarding
time and form. "20 This principle should clearly be incorporated in
the new Cuban constitution.
20. Id. at art. 92.
19. CONSTrucI6N DE CUBA art. 23.
[VoL 3
PROPERTY RIGHTS
By contrast, the second paragraph of Article 92, which
provides that trademarks used with an indication that the product is
of Cuban origin shall be null and void if used to cover articles
manufactured outside Cuban territory, seems better suited to
ordinary legislation. In essence, this provision bars one type of
trademark fraud. Whatever the merits of the rule, it hardly appears
necessary or advisable to include this level of detail in a post-Castro
constitution. A constitution should be the expression of the
fundamental values and choices of the nation, not a repository of
mundane government regulations. Trademark fraud does not rise
to the level of fundamental individual rights, nor is it a component
of the basic structure of government. Therefore, it should not be
a part of the new constitution.
B. The Non-Core Provisions
1. Article 33
The first paragraph of Article 33 guarantees to every person
the right to express his thoughts, free from prior censorship, in any
form, oral or written, and by any available medium of
communication. This principle is limited by the second paragraph
of Article 33, Which authorizes the seizure, by court order, of
books, phonograph records, films, newspapers or other publications
that "attack the honor of persons, social order or public peace. "21
This limitation affects not only the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the first paragraph of Article 33, but also the
property rights of those who own the books, phonographic records,
films, newspapers or other publications that the government is
authorized to seize.
The drafters of a democratic post-Castro constitution would
be well-advised to consider these restrictions warily. While no one
can deny that personal honor, social order, and public peace are
21. Id. at art. 33.
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worthy of legal protection, such protection should not be so
intrusive as to become a pretext for the abrogation of freedom of
expression, private property, or other fundamental rights. In this
respect, the limitation imposed by the second paragraph of Article
33 is on its face exceedingly broad and open to abuse. A provision
allowing the seizure of expressive materials on the ground that they
attack a person's honor could very well be used, for example, to
support the seizure of a book or newspaper article that criticizes
government officials or other persons who play important roles in
the life of the nation. Similarly, allowing the seizure of such
materials on grounds of preserving social order or public peace may
well lead to the suppression of political speech. Even the potential
for such seizures may inhibit freedom of expression as well as the
enjoyment of property rights over means of communication.
The difficulties presented by this provision illustrate the
intimate relationship between freedom of speech, which is the
cornerstone of a democratic system of government, and property
rights. In our view, a renascent Cuban democracy should not be
burdened with a constitutional provision that broadly constrains
both freedom of speech and property rights and in so doing offers
to future governments a way back to the totalitarian past.
2. Article 43
Article 43 sets forth basic principles for the legal protection
of marriages and the family. It provides, among other things, that
every married woman shall have the right to control her own
property, including the proceeds of her labor, without her husband's
permission. This is a special application of the principle, also
established in this article, that marriage shall be regulated on a basis
of absolute legal equality between the spouses.
These provisions abolish the ancient disability imposed on
married women as regards the management and disposition of their
own property. In so doing, they expand the universe of individuals
whose property rights enjoy constitutional protection. These
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principles should unquestionably be retained in a post-Castro
constitution.
3. Article 88
The first paragraph of Article 88 provides that all subsoil
rights belong to the State, which is authorized to grant concessions
for the exploitation of those rights in a manner to be prescribed by
law. This principle is technically a restriction on the scope of
property rights, for it is a departure from the traditional doctrine of
vertical property boundaries, under which an owner of land has
rights in his property a coelo usque ad centrum. But this doctrine
has been narrowed in many countries, especially in the areas of
overflight and mineral rights, to the point that private ownership of
all subsoil rights may now be the minority rule, particularly in
Latin America.Z Whether and to what extent subsoil rights in Cuba
should belong to the State is a public policy decision that must be
made by the Cuban people.
The second paragraph of Article 88 sets forth additional
restrictions on the use and enjoyment of certain kinds of property.
It provides that "[1]and, forests, and concessions for the exploitation
of the subsoil, means of transport and any other public service
enterprise shall be exploited in such a manner as to promote the
general welfare."' To the extent that this mandate exceeds the
limitations authorized by Article 87, it is overbroad, because it fails
to distinguish cases in which the property or enterprise constitutes
a monopoly from cases in which it does not. (Since Article 276
prohibits private monopolies in commerce, industry and agriculture,
22. See, e.g., CONsTrrUcI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DEL PER art. 66 (natural
resources, renewable or not, belong to the Nation) and arts. 138-139 (mining
rights, as well as rights to oil, gas and other hydrocarbon resources, inalienably
vested in the national government); See also CONsT. art. 27 (Mex.) (nation the
legal owner of all oil and mineral rights).
23. CONsTITUCION DE CUBA art. 88.
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the second paragraph of Article 88 may apply only to non-monopoly
cases). While it may be sound policy to regulate "natural"
monopolies or other permitted monopolies in the name of the
general welfare, the control of non-monopolic enterprises should be
left, in principle, to the free market. The framers of the post-
Castro constitution should consider discarding this paragraph,
relying instead on such limitations as may be adopted under Article
87. Alternatively, the framers should, at least, limit the rule of this
paragraph to such monopoly enterprises as they may decide to
tolerate notwithstanding the principle of Article 276. Still more
useful would be a provision that would require the State to promote
competition in the grant of public concessions and in the economy
at large.
4. Article 89
Article 89 grants the State a preferential right to purchase
(derecho de tanteo) in any forced sale of real estate or securities
representing real estate. The expression derecho de tanteo indicates
that the State may exercise its pre-emption right at the same price
offered by the highest private bidder in any such sale. This
provision amounts to a restriction on the property rights of both the
seller and the frustrated buyer of the property.
The rule of Article 89 was probably aimed at preventing the
conclusion of forced sales at artificially low prices resulting from
collusion among prospective bidders.24 Whatever the merits of this
policy, giving the state pre-emptive rights would promote public
ownership of property at a time the Cuban state should pursue the
opposite goal. Besides, in a non-collusive sale the existence of the
24. Until recently, French law gave the State a similar right of pre-emption in
respect of all sales of real estate, in order to prevent fraudulent understatement
of the purchase price and thus evasion of a tax calculated as a percentage of the
purchase price. The European Court of Human Rights has held this right of pre-
emption to be in violation of the right of property protected by Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights. Hentrich v.
France, 23 Eur. Ct. H.R.(ser. A) at 18 (1994).
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State's right of pre-emption would tend artificially to depress the
price by discouraging potential bidders from participating in the
sale. For these reasons, it would be wise to leave this provision out
of the new constitution, and rely on ordinary legislation to address
the problem of collusion in forced sales.
5. Article 90
The first paragraph of Article 90 provides that large estates
(latifundia) are "proscribed," and that laws shall be passed to break
up such estates by specifying the maximum amount of land that a
person or entity may hold for each particular type of land use. This
provision was drafted as a means of combating what was viewed as
the excessive accumulation of land in the hands of a few
individuals, which had given rise to large landed estates. But while
latifundia may have been a severe problem in Cuba in 1940, it is
neither efficient nor appropriate from the viewpoint of a modem
capitalist system to grant the government the ability to exercise such
broad control over property ownership. The maximum amount of
property that an individual or entity may own for a particular use
should be determined by the market return of that use, not by
government fiat. Leaving such power in the hands of the
government would almost certainly lead to an inefficient use of
resources and would retard economic development, something post-
Castro Cuba can ill afford.
The second paragraph of Article 90 provides for legislation
to restrict the acquisition and possession of land by foreign
individuals and companies and to promote reversion to Cuban
ownership. Given the situation in the years prior to 1940, during
which foreign (primarily United States) interests owned or
controlled the majority of the land and equipment used in the sugar
industry, it is understandable that the drafters of the constitution
viewed reacquisition of land from foreign interests as a
constitutional issue. In post-Castro Cuba, however, such a
provision would have the effect of stifling the needed inflow of
foreign investment capital.
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In sum, the ideas represented in Article 90 of the 1940
constitution do not seem appropriate for post-Castro Cuba.
Economic efficiency, through operation of market forces, should
dictate the size of individual land holdings. Foreign investment, as
countries such as Chile and Argentina have finally discovered after
long periods of decline, is not an instrument of economic
colonialism (as it was perceived to be in an earlier era), but rather
an engine for economic growth and prosperity. Cuba, which is
geographically closer than any other Latin American country to the
United States' large east-coast consumer market, is ideally situated
to benefit from foreign investment in manufacturing operations for
export to the United States market. But in order to take advantage
of this favorable position, potential investors must be assured of
equal treatment and freedom from over-regulation of the resources
market. For these reasons, neither Article 90 as written, nor the
ideas it represents, should be included in a new Cuban constitution.
6. Article 91
Article 91 allows the head of a household who owns a rural
property and inhabits, cultivates, and directly exploits such property
to designate a portion of it (not exceeding 2,000 pesos in value) as
"family property," rendering it exempt from taxes and attachment
but not alienable by him. This provision is similar to "homestead"
laws, adopted in some other countries for the purpose of protecting
family farmers and ensuring that they will not be deprived of their
means of basic subsistence.
It is important to realize, however, that if this provision
applied to land of more than a very modest value, it would become
an important barrier to the free alienability of agricultural property,
which is critical to the efficient use of land and other resources. At
this point in Cuba's history, full utilization of land, and a farmer's
ability to obtain credit, will be of prime importance to Cuba's
development. The drafters of the new Cuban constitution should
consider these implications carefully before adopting a "family
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property" provision that would allow a significant portion of the
country's agricultural land to be withdrawn from the market.
7. Article 93
Article 93 prohibits perpetual encumbrances in the form of
censos25 or similar restrictions, unless established for the benefit of
the State or in favor of public institutions or private charities.
Permanent encumbrances, by their nature, prevent land from being
put to its most efficient use. The prohibition established in this
article is therefore sound and should be retained in the post-Castro
constitution.
8. Article 252
Article 252 contains a set of restrictions on the alienability
of State property. It provides that property owned by the State as
if it were a private person may not be disposed of or encumbered,
unless the following conditions are met: (i) the divestiture or
encumbrance must be authorized by special act of the Congress,
adopted for reasons of social necessity or convenience by a vote of
two-thirds of each chamber; (ii) if the divestiture is a sale, it must
be carried out by public tender; and (iii) the proceeds of the
divestiture must be applied to creating jobs, providing public
services or meeting public needs. As an exception, if the
divestiture or encumbrance is carried out pursuant to a national
economic plan approved by a special act of the Congress, it may be
authorized by ordinary legislation and the requirement of a public
tender does not apply.
It is not clear why the drafters of this article sought to put
25. Censos are contracts whereby real property is subjected to payment of an
annuity in compensation for money advanced. Louis ROBB, DICCIONARIO DE
TtmMNos LEGALEs at 23 (1965).
24719951
248 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 3
these obstacles in the way of the alienation of State property."
Perhaps this provision reflects a bias toward State ownership or a
desire to prevent government corruption. Be that as it may, in a
democratic post-Castro Cuba it would be perverse to put excessive
restrictions on the efforts of the new government to make the most
efficient use of the country's resources. In particular, it would be
unwise to obstruct the new government's ability to privatize state
enterprises and thus reduce the size of the public sector inherited
from the prior regime. With this in mind, it seems a better course
to refrain from including a provision such as Article 252 in the new
constitution. Instead, the legislature should be expressly authorized
to sell or lease State-owned properties through the ordinary
legislative process.
9. Article 273
Article 273 provides that an owner of real estate whose
property increased in value solely as a result of action by the State,
a province, or a municipality must turn over to that entity a portion
of that increase as determined by law. This article appears to grant
to the various levels of government a share of any increment in the
value of land resulting from events such as the installation of a
water line serving the land, construction or improvement of a
nearby public road, or other manner of public works directly
benefiting the property.
It is uncertain, however, whether Article 273 would apply
to increases in value that may be attributable to general
infrastructure works, such as a harbor or an airport, which may
benefit a region (or the country as a whole) but not necessarily any
piece of property in particular. Nor is it clear whether the State
could claim a share of increments in land values attributable to its
general economic policies. Further, this article leaves open issues
such as how the increase in value would be calculated, what the
26. The records of the Constitutional Convention shed no light on this matter.
See 3 CONsTrUCi6N DE CUBA 227-28 (Andr6s M. Lazcano y Mazon ed. 1941).
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State's share would be, and how it would be paid to the State.
Apart from these uncertainties, the very principle embodied
in Article 273 is objectionable. One can imagine a situation in
which a municipality constructs a paved road adjacent to the
property of several individuals or entities, without the landowners'
agreement or even desire for such a road, and then assesses them an
amount representing the municipality's statutory share of the
increment in the property values attributable to the new road. If the
properties are subject to property tax and the added values are used
to increase the tax base, the owners may end up paying for the
added values over and over again.
In sum, the rule of Article 273 is open to substantial abuse.
If a piece of property increases in value solely as a result of
improvements made by the State, the State should recover the value
of the improvements only through taxation, whether in the form of
special tax assessments or regular taxes applied to the increased tax
base of the property.
10. Articles 274 and 275
Article 274 restricts leasing and farming rights related to
rural property. It does so by providing for the regulation of leases,
cane-planting and sharecropping contracts concerning such
properties, and specifying in considerable detail the matters to be
regulated and the nature of the restrictions to be established.
Article 275 requires the passage of legislation to regulate planting
and grinding of sugar cane by sugar mills, to prevent vertical
integration of the sugar industry.
These restrictions reflect the peculiar circumstances existing
in Cuba in 1940: the overwhelming role of the cane sugar industry
in the Cuban economy, the extent of government intervention in
that industry, and the perceived need to protect small lessees and
sharecroppers from exploitation by large landowners and sugar
mills. Whether or not these provisions were justifiable in 1940,
they are now relics of a bygone era. The drafters of the new
constitution will have to decide, on the basis of the economic and
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social conditions left behind by the wreck of the Castro regime,
whether small farmers are in need of special protection and whether
strict regulation of the sugar industry makes any economic sense.
If they so conclude, they may wisely address the problem through
ordinary legislation rather than by inflexible constitutional mandate.
11. Article 276
Article 276 renders null and void any statute or other legal
provision that creates a private monopoly or that regulates
commerce, industry or agriculture in such a way as to produce the
same result. It also calls for legislation to prevent monopolization
of commercial activities in industrial and agricultural
establishments.
The principle of competition underlying Article 276 is
generally recognized as one of the pillars of a modem capitalist
economy. It should undoubtedly be enshrined in the new Cuban
constitution. In drafting an appropriate provision, the framers of
the new charter should consider expanding the principle to apply
not only to the regulation of commerce, industry and agriculture,
but also to other economic activities such as labor and the
professions .27
IV. CONCLUSION
In analyzing how property rights should be protected by a
democratic Cuban constitution, it is natural to use as a point of
departure the provisions of the 1940 constitution. The 1940
constitution, which is widely regarded as the product of a ftee and
27. An early draft of Article 276 referred to "commerce, industry, labor and
the professions." 3 CONVENTION REcoRDs at 288. The text was changed to
"commerce, industry and agriculture" for the purpose of excluding private
monopolies such as the Medical Association. The drafters of the new
constitution will have an opportunity to subject the professions to the discipline
of the market.
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representative political process, still commands respect and enjoys
legitimacy among the heirs to the democratic Cuban tradition. But
for all its legitimacy, the 1940 constitution largely reflects the
issues, conflicts, ideologies, circumstances, and political
compromises of the 1930s. At least in the area of property rights,
the 1940 constitution sometimes speaks in accents that, on the eve
of the twenty-first century, are no longer easy to recognize.
That is why we have suggested changes aimed at bringing
the provisions of the 1940 constitution into harmony with the
democratic, free-market revolution that has swept most of Latin
America during the past decade. The regime of Fidel Castro has
left Cubans in chains and in tatters. As other Latin American
countries have now learned, it is political and economic freedom,
not government paternalism, that allows individuals and
communities to rise from poverty, to exercise their creative and
entrepreneurial talents, and to pursue their own visions of
happiness. But there can be no political and economic freedom
without strong protection for the right to own and to enjoy property
under the discipline of the market.
In this light, we suggest that, among those provisions of the
1940 constitution that are related to property rights, what we have
called the core provisions (Articles 24, 87, 23 and 97), could be
incorporated in the new post-Castro constitution with a few
important changes. The non-core provisions should be approached
more selectively. Some of them (Articles 43, 93 and 276), or at
least the principles underlying them, are unobjectionable and should
be retained. Others (Articles 33, 90, 252, 273, and the second
paragraph of Article 88) are largely inconsistent with the principles
of a free market and a free society or with the economic needs of
present-day Cuba and should be left out of the new constitution.
Still others (Article 91 and the first paragraph of Article 88) may or
may not be acceptable depending on certain basic political decisions
to be made by the representatives of the Cuban people. Finally,
there are provisions (Articles 89, 274, 275, and the second part of
Article 92) that should be the subject of ordinary legislation rather
than constitutional mandate.
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What should be recognized as property rights and how much
such fights should be protected by a post-Castro democratic
constitution are fundamental political choices that must be made at
the appropriate time by the genuine representatives of all Cubans.
Those choices will involve not only the application of political and
economic theories but also complex prudential judgments based on
the history, traditions, culture and aspirations of the Cuban people.
We, as non-Cubans, offer the suggestions contained in this paper in
a spirit of modesty and deference to those who will have the
monumental task of rebuilding Cuban society and institutions from
the rubble left behind by the Castro regime.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The collectivization of the Cuban economy was
accomplished by the Castro regime primarily through confiscations
and forced transfers of private property owned by Cubans and
foreigners. Since little or no compensation was paid, a post-Castro
government should be prepared for an avalanche of claims from
dispossessed owners, Cuban and foreign, for restitution of their
properties or payment of just compensation. As long as those
claims are left unresolved by the new government, title to those
properties will remain under a cloud. Such insecurity will in turn
hinder the development of stable markets and discourage the large-
scale investments required for the reconstruction of the Cuban
economy.
These considerations suggest that one of the early tasks of
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a post-Castro government should be to devise a policy or program
to resolve, in a definitive manner, the existing and potential
property claims of the dispossessed owners. In this paper we
modestly propose, in the form of an outline, a Program for the
Restoration of Property Rights (the "Program") intended to be
adopted by a democratic Cuban government. It is a restoration
program, as distinguished from a mere restitution or compensation
program, because it is designed to provide those who have
meritorious claims a flexible combination of remedies (restitution,
compensation, and compensation-in-kind), and because it allows for
the possibility of re-establishing, if physically possible and
economically feasible, property rights and legal relationships that
were destroyed by the Castro regime.
In devising the proposed Program, we have weighed a
multitude of factors such as the principles at stake; the feasibility of
restitution; the physical condition, legal status and current use of the
property; the possibility of intervening transfers, the need to foster
the productive use of the property; and the financial resources
expected to be available to a post-Castro government. We have
also considered the experience of other former socialist states in
formulating and administering comparable programs.
While the Program is designed to be sufficiently flexible to
give each of these considerations its due, its primary goal is to treat
Cuban and non-Cuban claimants alike under standards no less
favorable than those required for non-Cubans under international
law. Under international law, non-Cubans whose properties were
taken by the Castro regime without just compensation are entitled
to certain standards of protection and certain means of redress,
including restitution of the property or, if restitution is not feasible,
payment of the fair market value of the property at the time of the
taking, with interest at market rates from that time to the time of
payment.1 Cuban claimants whose properties suffered the same fate
1. See Brice M. Clagett, Public International Legal Standards Applicable to
Property Expropriation in Cuba, in CUBA IN TRANSITION: OPTIONS FOR
ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGE OF EXPROPRIATED PROPERTIES, 13-19 (JoAnn
[Vol 3
PROPERTY RIGHTS
ought to be entitled, as a matter of fairness and sound policy, to the
same standards of protection and means of redress.
The Program is intended to provide a comprehensive legal
framework for the orderly restoration of property rights that were
confiscated, forcibly transferred, or otherwise taken or seized from
the lawful owners by the Castro regime, in violation of the
principles of the Cuban constitution of 1940 or those of
international law. Within this compass, the Program would apply
to all kinds of property rights, including ownership, other interests
in property, contract rights, and intellectual property.
The Program would not apply, however, to claims that have
been finally settled by international adjudication or agreement
between the Cuban State and the State of which the claimant is a
national. Nor would it apply to so-called human-rights claims, such
as those for wrongful death, torture, or imprisonment inflicted by
the agents of the Castro regime. These claims raise issues that are
not suitable to be resolved in a program designed to redress
property claims. If human-rights claims are to be compensated, the
remedy should be provided under a separate program.
The Program is designed to provide a remedy to the
dispossessed owners of the property rights at issue, regardless of
nationality or citizenship. The remedy may be restitution,
compensation, or compensation-in-kind. Restitution would be the
preferred remedy, unless it should be physically impossible,
economically impracticable, or injurious to the public interest. (In
the case of an occupied residential building or unit, there would be
a rebuttable presumption that restitution would not be in the public
interest). If restitution is inapplicable, the ordinary substitute
remedy would be compensation in an amount equal to the full
market value of the property at the time of dispossession, plus
interest. As an alternative to restitution or compensation, the
authority administering the Program would have the power to offer,
subject to the claimant's acceptance, compensation-in-kind.
Klein ed., 1994) (papers presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American
Bar Association).
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Compensation-in-kind would be another property held by the State,
preferably of a kind or value comparable with those of the property
in question.
One of the most important features of the Program is the
Investment Priority Exception. Should there be an urgent need to
promote the productive use of the property or business at issue, the
administering authority would be empowered to sell that property
or business to the private sector, by public tender. In such cases,
the claimant would have the right to participate in the tender.
Should the claim be later adjudicated in his favor, he would be
entitled to restitution of the purchase price or to compensation,
depending on whether or not he was the successful bidder in the
tender.
The Program, and any other program of its kind, will be
workable only if it is provided with an unassailable legal basis, so
that its implementation is not bogged down in endless legal
wrangling. Accordingly, it is proposed on the following
assumptions:
1. The Program will be adopted by a new post-Castro
government as part of a comprehensive process of democratization
of the state and liberation of the economy.
2. The Program will be authorized by the new Cuban
constitution in such a way that its constitutional validity is
unquestionable. For example, the constitution could be drafted to
include a transitional provision that incorporates the Program by
reference, while making sure that there is no unresolved conflict
between such transitional provision and the regular provisions of the
constitution dealing with property rights.
3. For purposes of implementing the Program, the new
constitution will also confirm legal title to property held by the
State under the law existing at the time the constitution takes effect,
and will grant to the agency charged with administering the
Program the power to take any and all actions required for such
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implementation, including the power to expropriate, subject only to
the remedies provided for in the Program.
4. The Program (and the decisions taken to implement it)
will override general legislation, including the provisions of the
Civil Code regarding the acquisition of title by adverse possession.
5. The Program (and the decisions taken implement it) will
override any vested rights and any claims of vested rights.
6. The Program will constitute the sole remedy under Cuban
law (foreign claimants will always have remedies under
international law) in respect of the claims covered thereby.
7. The decisions of the authority charged with administering
the Program shall be final, except for the possibility of an expedited
appeal to the Cuban Supreme Court.
These assumptions are necessary, but not sufficient,
conditions for the success of the Program. Other requirements are
self-evident, such as the need for an administering agency composed
of individuals of unimpeachable probity and free from ritualistic
procedures.
While a good deal of flexibility is desired in the fabric of the
Program, we readily acknowledge that its success or failure will
depend on the resources available to a post-Castro government, in
comparison with the number and magnitude of the claims expected
to be filed. In that respect, the Program (any program) may have
to be adjusted to the conditions existing at the time the new
government takes office. As for now, we see no reason to lower
our sights before knowing the height of the target.
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II. THE PROGRAM
A. Rights Subject to the Restoration Program
1. General Rule. All property rights that were the
subject of wrongful expropriation by the Castro regime shall be
subject to the Program.
2. Property Rights. For the purposes of the Program,
the term "property rights" shall comprise patrimonial rights of any
kind whatsoever, including ownership and other rights in rem in
moveable or immoveable things, intellectual property, rights
derived from contracts, and other patrimonial rights in personam,
but shall not include (i) rights corresponding to claims that have
been finally settled by agreement between the Cuban State and the
State of which the claimant was a national or citizen at the time the
claim arose (or at the time of the agreement), and (ii) rights
corresponding to indemnification claims for personal injury or
moral damages resulting from the actions or omissions of the Castro
regime, including claims for wrongful death, torture, and unjust
imprisonment.
3. Wrongful Expropriation.
(a) For the purposes of the Program, a property right
shall be deemed to have been the subject of wrongful expropriation
if (i) it was the subject of expropriation, confiscation or
nationalization, or was otherwise taken, seized, abolished or
extinguished, in whole or in part, by the Castro regime, in each
such case in violation of the principles and guarantees set forth in
the constitution of 1940 or in violation of international law; or (ii)
such right lapsed or was forfeited, lost, extinguished or transferred
to the State, in whole or in part, as a consequence of acts of
political persecution by the Castro regime, or criminal or other
proceedings conducted during the Castro regime that were contrary
to the rule of law.
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(b) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality
of the foregoing, a property right shall be deemed to have been the
subject of wrongful expropriation in any of the following
circumstances:
(i) Whenever the right was the subject of
expropriation, confiscation or nationalization, or was
otherwise taken, seized, abolished or extinguished, in whole
or in part, by the Castro regime without payment of
compensation or with payment of less compensation than
that required by the principles set forth in paragraphs
(C)(3)(b)(i) and (C)(3)(b)(ii).
(ii) Whenever the right was the subject of
expropriation, confiscation or nationalization, or was
otherwise taken, seized, abolished or extinguished, in whole
or in part, by the Castro regime by reason of the owner's
nationality or citizenship or condition of alienage, or as a
penalty for a political crime, or as a result of criminal or
other proceedings that were contrary to the rule of law or
aimed at punishing political crimes, or solely as a
consequence of a person having left the country.
(iii) Whenever the right lapsed or was forfeited,
lost or extinguished, in whole or in part, by reason of the
owner's nationality or citizenship or condition of alienage,
or as a result of imprisonment or other punishment imposed
by the Castro regime for a political crime, or as a result of
criminal or other proceedings conducted by the Castro
regime that were contrary to the rule of law or aimed at
punishing political crimes, or solely as a consequence of a
person having left the country.
(iv) Whenever the right was transferred or
abandoned by the owner to the State as a condition for the
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owner or his family obtaining permission to leave the
country.
(v) As regards the prior owner, whenever the
right was acquired, in whole or in part, during the Castro
regime by an individual or an entity (governmental or
otherwise) through exploitation (including the use of duress
or deception) of a position of power in or influence with the
Castro regime.
(c) Notwithstanding paragraphs (A)(3)(a) and (A)(3)(b),
a property right shall not be deemed to have been the subject of
wrongful expropriation if the owner thereof received compensation
from the Cuban State in an amount that is not less than the amount
that would have been required by the principles set forth in
paragraphs (C)(3)(b)(i) and (C)(3)(b)(ii).
4. Castro Regime. For the purposes of the Program,
the Castro regime shall be understood to be the regime that held
power in Cuba between January 1, 1959, and [the date on which the
democratic government takes office] and any official or unofficial
instrumentality thereof.
B. Beneficiaries of the Restoration Program
1. Beneficiaries. The beneficiaries of the Program shall
be of two kinds: (i) primary beneficiaries and (ii) secondary
beneficiaries.
(a) Primary Beneficiaries. The primary beneficiaries of
the Program shall be, in respect of each property right subject to the
Program, (i) those individuals or entities (other than ineligible
parties), regardless of nationality or citizenship, that held,
immediately prior to the wrongful expropriation, title to the
property right in whole or in part, and (ii) the successors of such
individuals or entities.
[Vol 3
PROPERTY RIGHTS
(b) Secondary Beneficiaries. Any individual or entity
(other than an ineligible party), regardless of nationality or
citizenship, that is deprived of a property right as a result of the
application of the Program but is entitled to compensation or
compensation-in-kind thereunder by reason of such deprivation shall
be deemed to be a secondary beneficiary of the Program only for
the purposes of such compensation or compensation-in-kind.
(c) Ineligible Parties. For the purposes of the Program,
the following shall be considered ineligible parties: (i) the Cuban
State, (ii) any Cuban governmental entity, (iii) any individual or
entity that acquired the property right at issue through exploitation
(including use of duress or deception) of a position of power in or
influence with the Castro regime, and (iv) any individual or entity
that acquired the property right at issue from any other ineligible
party without giving, in exchange, value (in cash or in kind) that
was reasonably equivalent to the value of such property right at the
time of the acquisition.
2. Claims. Any beneficiary is entitled to make a claim
under the Program. In cases of property rights held jointly by more
than one individual or entity, before granting the appropriate
remedy under the Program to those beneficiaries who have made a
claim, the Adjudicatory Commission (hereinafter defined) shall give
to other beneficiaries reasonable notice and opportunity to come
forward. The same rule shall apply in respect of property rights
encumbered by or subject to other property rights held by other
beneficiaries.
3. Priority of Claims. Other than in the case of
property rights held jointly, if two or more primary beneficiaries
make claims under the Program with respect to the same property
right, the claimant in the chain of title who suffered the earliest
wrongful expropriation shall have priority for the purpose of
restitution of such right. The other claimants shall receive
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compensation or compensation-in-kind in accordance with the
Program.
4. Successors.
(a) For the purposes of the Program, the term
"successor" of a beneficiary shall mean any individual or entity to
whom the property right at issue, or a claim related thereto has
been transferred, directly or through one or more intermediate
transferors, by an act of the beneficiary or by operation of the law,
and shall include heirs, legatees, donees, purchasers, assignees and
other transferees inter vivos or mortis causa. Any such transfer
shall be deemed valid and effective if (i) it is valid and effective
under Cuban law as it existed prior to the advent of the Castro
regime or would have been valid and effective under such law had
such law remained in effect throughout the Castro regime, or (ii) it
is valid and effective under Cuban law as it existed under the Castro
regime (but without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph
(B)(1)(c) regarding ineligible parties), or (iii) it is valid and
effective under the law of any country where the transfer took place
or the transferor or the transferee was organized or had its domicile
or residence or conducted business.
(b) If the beneficiary is a business organization that is no
longer in existence and no successor to such organization can be
determined under the rule of paragraph (B)(4)(a), a claim under the
Program may be brought by those who held at least fifty per centum
of the equity of such organization (or their respective successors).
In such case, the claimants shall be regarded as successors to the
beneficiary for the purposes of the Program. To this end,
reasonable notice and opportunity to come forward shall be given
to other individuals or entities who held equity in the organization.
PROPERTY RIGHTS
C. Remedies
1. General.
The available remedies under the Program shall be (i)
restitution, (ii) compensation, and (iii) compensation-in-kind.
Restitution shall be the preferred remedy, except in the cases
contemplated in paragraph (C)(5), in which restitution is unfeasible,
and the cases contemplated in paragraph (C)(6), which are subject
to the investment-priority exception. Whenever restitution is not
applicable, the ordinary substitute remedy shall be compensation.
In all cases, however, the Adjudicatory Commission may offer to
the beneficiary and the beneficiary may accept, in lieu of restitution
or compensation, compensation-in-kind.
2. Restitution.
(a) General rule. Except as set forth in paragraphs
(C)(5) and (C)(6), a primary beneficiary under the Program shall be
entitled to restitution in full of the property right that was the
subject of a wrongful expropriation (or, in the case of a wrongful
expropriation regarding part of a property right, the part that was
the subject of such wrongful expropriation), whether such right is
currently held by the State or by a third party. To this end, the
Adjudicatory Commission shall segregate and/or reconstitute such
rights, to the extent possible, and shall transfer them to the
beneficiary. Except as provided in paragraph (C)(2)(b), such
property rights shall be transferred free and clear of all
encumbrances other than any encumbrances that existed at the time
of the wrongful expropriation and (i) are still in existence at the
time of the restitution or (ii) are reinstated under the Program.
Encumbrances that existed at the time of the wrongful expropriation
but are no longer in existence at the time of the restitution shall be
reinstated (i) in favor of any primary beneficiary that is entitled
under the Program to restitution of the corresponding property
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rights, or (ii) in favor of the State, subject to further application of
the Program.
(b) Restitution of Business Enterprises. If the property
rights that are subject to restitution comprise a business enterprise
that is conducting business as a going concern at the time of the
restitution, as a general rule those property rights shall be
transferred to the primary beneficiary that is entitled to restitution
thereof subject to all existing encumbrances and such primary
beneficiary shall assume, as a condition of the restitution, all
existing obligations and liabilities of the enterprise, including all
existing labor contracts and other contracts that call for further
performance. In exceptional circumstances, to encourage the
prompt return of the business enterprise to the private sector as a
viable concern or otherwise when the interests of the enterprise and
the national economy so require, the Adjudicatory Commission
shall have the power to cancel such encumbrances, obligations or
liabilities, in whole or in part, and to order the restitution of the
enterprise in the resulting condition. In all cases contemplated in
this paragraph, the primary beneficiary shall be entitled to
additional compensation as provided in paragraph (C)(3)(e), but the
amount of such compensation shall be determined by taldng into
account the benefit to such primary beneficiary arising from any
cancelled encumbrance, obligation or liability. Any party (other
than an ineligible party) that was entitled to the benefit of any such
cancelled encumbrance, obligation or liability, shall have the rights
specified in paragraph (C)(3)(f).
(c) Restitution of Property Rights Not Comprising
Business Enterprises. In the case of property rights other than those
referred to in paragraph (C)(2)(b), any encumbrance on such
property rights that did not exist at the time of the wrongful
expropriation shall be cancelled. The primary beneficiary that
obtains restitution of such property rights shall be entitled to
additional compensation to the extent provided in paragraph
(C)(3)(e). Any party (other than an ineligible party) that was
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entitled to the benefit of any such cancelled encumbrance shall have
the fights specified in paragraph (C)(3)(f).
3. Compensation.
(a) Exclusive Source of Compensation. A beneficiary
entitled to compensation under the Program shall receive
compensation from the Compensation Fund, as provided in the
Program, to the exclusion of compensation from any other source.
(b) Measure of Compensation. Whenever compensation
is required under the Program, such compensation shall consist of
a principal amount and interest thereon, calculated as follows:
(i) Business Enterprises. In the case of property
rights in any business enterprise that was conducting
business as a going concern at the time of the wrongful
expropriation, the principal amount of compensation shall be
equal to the going-concern value of such enterprise
immediately prior to such expropriation, as measured by the
fair market value of such enterprise, or, in the absence of an
observable, genuine market for such enterprise, by the
discounted-cash-flow method. Such value shall not be
deemed to have been reduced by the threat of expropriation
or any other action of the Castro regime that was
inconsistent with the guarantees provided by the constitution
of 1940 or directed against such business enterprise or the
owner or owners thereof.
(ii) Other Property Rights. In the case of any
property right other than those related to the business
enterprises referred to in paragraph (C)(3)(b)(i), the
principal amount of compensation shall be equal to the fair
market value of such right immediately prior to the
wrongful expropriation. Such value shall not be deemed to
have been reduced by the threat of expropriation or any
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other action of the Castro regime that was inconsistent with
the guarantees provided by the constitution of 1940 or was
directed against such property rights or the owner or owners
thereof.
(iii) Currency of Calculation. To the extent
feasible, the principal amount of compensation shall in all
cases be calculated in Cuban pesos and shall be converted
into United States dollars at the "buy" free-market rate of
exchange in effect on the date of the wrongful expropriation.
Otherwise such principal amount shall be calculated in
United States dollars.
(iv) Interest. In all cases, the principal amount of
compensation shall be augmented by interest thereon from
the date of the wrongful expropriation to the date of
payment of compensation under the Program. Such interest
shall be calculated at such free-market rates for dollar
obligations as shall be adequate fairly to compensate the
beneficiary for having been deprived of the use and
enjoyment of the principal amount during such period.
(c) Form of Compensation.
(i) Compensation under the Program shall be
paid in the form of cash or debt obligations of the Cuban
Treasury, or a combination thereof, as determined by the
Adjudicatory Commission taking into account the
availability of cash in the Compensation Fund, the
compensation awards to be paid, and other appropriate
factors.
(ii) Compensation in the form of cash shall
consist of United States dollars or the equivalent thereof in
Cuban currency at the "buy" free-market rate of exchange
in effect on the date of the payment, except that those
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beneficiaries that are not Cuban citizens shall not be
obligated to accept Cuban currency if the currency is not
freely convertible into United States dollars at the same rate
of exchange.
(iii) In the case of compensation in the form of
debt obligations of the Cuban Treasury, the obligations shall
be issued at par, shall be denominated in United States
dollars, shall bear interest at a fair market rate, shall be
freely transferable, and shall be payable in as short a term
and under such conditions and with such security or
guarantees, as shall be compatible with the financial
condition of the Cuban State. The holder of any such debt
security shall have the option of applying it, at par, towards
payment of the purchase price of any asset of the State that
is privatized, whether pursuant to paragraph (C)(6) or
otherwise.
(d) Compensation in Lieu of Restitution. Any primary
beneficiary that is entitled to compensation in lieu of restitution
pursuant to paragraph (C)(5) or (C)(6)(c), or whose claim does not
have priority pursuant to paragraph (C)(3), shall receive
compensation as provided in the preceding paragraphs.
(e) Additional Compensation in Cases of Restitution.
Any primary beneficiary who obtains restitution of property rights
shall be entitled to additional compensation: (i) in an amount that
shall approximate as much as possible the amount (if any) by which
the value of such property rights at the time of the wrongful
expropriation exceeds the value of such rights at the time of the
restitution, and (ii) in an amount, to be equitably determined by the
Adjudicatory Commission, designed to compensate the beneficiary
for having been deprived of the use and enjoyment of such property
rights between the time of dispossession and the time of restitution.
For the purposes of clause (i), the value of the property rights at
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such times shall be determined by applying the appropriate
provisions of paragraph (C)(3)(b), mutatis mutandis.
(f) Compensation to Eligible Third Parties.
(i) Any third party (other than an ineligible
party) that is the beneficiary of any encumbrance, obligation
or liability that is cancelled as provided in paragraph
(C)(2)(b) shall be deemed to be a secondary beneficiary
under the Program and entitled to compensation if such
party demonstrates that such encumbrance, obligation or
liability was created in good faith, for reasonably equivalent
value, and in the ordinary course of business of the
enterprise subject to restitution.
(ii) Any third party (other than an ineligible
party) that is the beneficiary of any encumbrance, obligation
or liability that is cancelled as provided in paragraph
(C)(2)(c) shall be deemed to be a secondary beneficiary
under the Program and entitled to compensation if such
party demonstrates that such encumbrance, obligation or
liability was created in good faith and for reasonably
equivalent value.
(iii) Any third party (other than an ineligible
party) that is dispossessed of any property right as a result
of the implementation of this Program shall be deemed to be
a secondary beneficiary under the Program and entitled to
compensation if such third party demonstrates that, at the
time it acquired such property right, that party was not
aware, and had no reason to be aware, of the wrongful
nature of the expropriation and did not know or have reason
to know of the existence of a claim to such property right.
(iv) In all cases contemplated in paragraph
(C)(3)(f), the compensation shall approximate as much as
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possible the value of the property right immediately prior
to the cancellation or dispossession (as the case may be), as
determined by the appropriate provisions of paragraph
(C)(3)(b), mutatis mutandis.
4. Compensation-in-Kind. Whenever a primary or
secondary beneficiary is entitled to restitution or compensation (as
the case may be) under the Program, the Adjudicatory Commission
may offer to such beneficiary compensation-in-kind, in lieu of all
or part of such restitution or compensation. Compensation-in-kind
shall consist in the transfer to the beneficiary of any property right
held by the State, preferably one that is comparable in kind or value
with the property right of which the beneficiary was deprived. In
making an offer of compensation-in-kind, the Adjudicatory
Commission shall take into consideration the qualifications of the
beneficiary to put the object of the property right being offered to
economically productive use within the shortest possible time. The
Adjudicatory Commission shall be free to devise the conditions
under which the property rights offered as compensation-in-kind
would be transferred to the beneficiary. The beneficiary shall not
be required to accept the offer of compensation-in-kind. Unless the
offer of compensation-in-kind is made and accepted in satisfaction
of the beneficiary's entire claim, the beneficiary shall be entitled to
additional compensation representing the amount (if any) by which
the value of the property right of which he was deprived exceeds
the value of the property right received as compensation-in-kind.
Such values shall be determined by applying the appropriate
provisions of paragraph (C)(3)(b), mutatis mutandis.
5. Unfeasibility of Restitution. Whenever restitution of
wrongfully expropriated property rights is physically impossible,
economically impracticable, or injurious to the public interest, it
shall be set aside in favor of compensation or, if applicable,
compensation-in-kind. Without prejudice to the generality of the
foregoing, restitution shall be deemed to be physically impossible,
economically impracticable or injurious to the public interest under
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the following circumstances:
(a) Whenever the property rights at issue relate to a
business enterprise that has ceased to operate and there is no
reasonable prospect of restarting it.
(b) Whenever the property rights at issue relate to a
business enterprise that has been merged into or integrated with a
larger business concern and such enterprise cannot be disassociated
or disintegrated without serious damage to the business as a whole
or the public interest.
(c) Whenever the object of the property rights at issue
will be used by the government for a valid public purpose.
(d) Whenever the object of the property rights at issue
has been integrated into a patrimony given over to a business or
charitable use and such object cannot be separated without serious
damage to such business or charitable use or the public interest.
(e) Whenever the object of the property rights at issue
is an occupied residential building or unit, unless the Adjudicatory
Commission determines that, taldng into account all circumstances
of the case, restitution will not be injurious to the public interest.
In the case of an occupied residential building or unit, the
Adjudicatory Commission may offer, and the primary beneficiary
may agree, (i) to postpone restitution until such time as the
occupant has vacated the building or unit or for such period as may
be designated by [a separate statute addressing the housing problem,
hereinafter referred to as "the Housing Law"], during which period
the primary beneficiary shall be entitled to compensation for the
delay, in an equitable amount determined by the Adjudicatory
Commission, or (ii) to make restitution subject to leases granted to
the occupant(s) of such building or unit for such term and subject
to such conditions as are specified in the Housing Law.
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(f) Whenever the object of the property rights at issue
has a fair market value, at the time of the inception of the Program,
not exceeding [an amount to be specified] in the case of real estate
and [an amount to be specified] in the case of other kinds of
property.
6. Investment Priority Exception.
(a) If, prior to final adjudication of the status of a
particular property, business enterprise or any other property right
subject to the Program, the Adjudicatory Commission finds that
such property, business enterprise or other property right is not
being put to economically productive use or that the public interest
requires immediate transfer of such property, business enterprise or
other property right to the private sector, it may make a public
tender for bids to acquire such property, business enterprise or
other property right. Whenever feasible, the public tender shall be
conducted in two stages: (i) a qualification stage, at which each
bidder shall offer a minimum investment commitment and, in the
case of business enterprises, the bidder's qualifications as an
operator of the business; and (ii) a price stage, at which each
qualified bidder shall bid on the price. The successful bidder shall
enter into an Acquisition and Investment Agreement with the
Adjudicatory Commission.
(b) Any individual or entity that has filed a prima facie
valid claim for restitution of the property, business or other
property right subject to the preceding paragraph shall have the
right to participate in the public tender, under the same conditions
as all other bidders, except that such individual or entity shall be
deemed to be fully qualified as an operator of the business. If the
successful bidder is the individual or entity that filed the restitution
claim and such claim is ultimately resolved in favor of the claimant,
the claimant shall be entitled to restitution of the acquisition price.
(c) If the property, business or other property right is
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sold to a third party, the beneficiary that would otherwise be
entitled to restitution shall receive, in lieu of restitution,
compensation pursuant to paragraph (C)(3)(d), or, as applicable,
compensation-in-kind pursuant to paragraph (C)(4).
7. Recoupment by the State.
(a) The proceeds of the sale of properties, business
enterprises or other property rights under paragraph (C)(6) and any
funds recovered by the State pursuant to the following provisions
shall be deposited in the Compensation Fund.
(b) If the State is required to pay compensation under the
Program by reason of a diminution in the value of any property
right, and such diminution was the result of damage to the object of
such property right, the State shall be entitled to recover
compensation for such damages from any individual or entity (other
than an individual or entity entitled to compensation under
paragraph (C)(3)(f)) responsible for the damage.
(c) As regards any property right that is the subject of
restitution under the Program, if the value at the time of restitution
of such property right (or the object of such right) is higher than the
corresponding value at the time of the wrongful expropriation, the
State shall be entitled to recover from the primary beneficiary that
obtained restitution of such property right the portion (if any) of
such increase in value that is solely and directly attributable to
actions of the State or of any third party that held such property
right at any time between the wrongful expropriation and the
restitution.
(d) If a primary beneficiary that obtains restitution,
compensation or compensation-in-kind under the Program received
partial compensation from the State prior to the inception of the
Program by reason of the wrongful expropriation, the State shall be
entitled to recover from such beneficiary the amount of such partial
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compensation, and interest thereon from the date of receipt thereof
to the date of recovery, at rates equal to those set forth in
subparagraph (C)(3)(b)(iv).
(e) In any case in which the State is entitled, under the
Program, to recover monies from an individual or entity that is
entitled to compensation (or additional compensation) under the
Program, such entitlements and the correlative obligations shall be
offset automatically.
(f) The State shall be entitled to the benefit of any
encumbrance that (i) is reinstated under the Program, as
contemplated in paragraph (C)(2)(a), and (ii) is not transferred to
any beneficiary under the Program.
D. Administering Authority and Procedure
1. Establishment of the Adjudicatory Commission as the
administering authority of the Program.
2. Establishment of the Compensation Fund. The
Compensation Fund shall contain (i) monies and financial
instruments contributed by the Cuban Treasury, and (ii) the monies
referred to in paragraph (C)(7)(a).
3. Procedure for filing and processing of claims,
including deadlines for fiing claims.
4. Prohibition of transfer or disposal of property rights
subject to the Program while a claim is pending, except for
dispositions by the Adjudicatory Commission pursuant to paragraph
(C)(6) (Investment Priority Exception).
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